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This paper suggests that the benefits of market inte-
gration project reach an asymptotic limit in the realm 
of close communities when adherence to the same 
values is critical to achieve internal market reform 
rather than the other way round. An optimal context 
of market integration is hypothesized as a territory 
circumscribed by economic frontiers within which 
jurisdictions are willing, on the one hand, to share re-
sources with other members to reap the benefits from 
externalities and economies of scale, and, on the oth-
er hand, are able to target policy initiatives at a geo-
graphical scale that reflect directly regional common-
ality. This theoretical framework is illustrated with a 
discussion of Romania as a country case by drawing 
on cluster analysis and trade integration data.
Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Cojanu, V. 2013. On economic frontiers: exploring the 
rationale behind modern market integration, Ekonomska istraživanja – Economic Research 26(4): 1-20
ON ECONOMIC FRONTIERS: EXPLORING THE RATIONALE BEHIND MODERN MARKET INTEGRATION2
Valentin Cojanu 
I. INTRODUCTION
At the time of this writing, the European Union (EU) nears a moment of decision. Prolonged finan-
cial instability, fragile economic recovery, and credible threats about the Euro-zone disintegration 
are frequent distressing news which seems to indicate that the process of regional integration 
exhausted most of the political and economic gains associated with the formation of the Euro-
pean Economic Community (EEC) in 1957 and its development into a Common Market in 1992. 
Besides monetary costs, the intensity and duration of the 2008 financial crisis have also inflicted 
institutional strain by exposing the weakness of the EU in defending its landmark goal of creating 
an economic and political union. The ‘integration fatigue’ has emerged as a matter of academic 
concern (Monti, 2010; Lianos and Gerard, 2012).
To advance solutions for the viability of the European integration project, further resources 
for growth are to be found in circumstances markedly different from that of the 1950s and even 
of the 1980s. Completion of the single market has not only reached an advanced stage in the 
regulatory realm, but also become a continental feature, with 28 European countries currently 
implementing the acquis communautaire. With each step forward, the complexity required by 
the governance of the Union has changed the operating logic of integration with an increasing 
emphasis on the subsidiarity principle narrowing the focus of the EU initiatives to preferences of 
actors others than member states such as disadvantaged social groups, underdeveloped regions, 
regions of knowledge, or territorial groupings. To sustain the sources of future benefits, the eco-
nomic view of liberalism needs revisiting in light of the present-day challenge of European integra-
tion à géométrie variable which eclipsed the adoption of common policies as the preeminent 
force behind market integration. The ensuing argument rests on the observation that the benefits 
of liberalism depend increasingly on policy measures that incorporate the economic frontier as a 
distinct analytical issue. 
One remarkably illustrative case to anticipate our discussion is Belgium, a polity and actor 
of international relations founded on a cohabitation of two historical areas, Flanders and Wal-
lonia, set apart by linguistic differences, political divergence and dissimilar economic governance. 
Oosterlynck (2010) produces a rich historical narrative to illustrate how this political-economic 
space, labelled Belgium in 1830, hampered or stimulated, depending on ‘contingent territorial and 
scalar politics’, a functioning economic entity able ‘to territorialise social relations.’ At origin, a 
project of a coalition between the Catholic Church and the liberal bourgeoisie, mainly residing in 
Brussels, the Belgian state seemed no more than a political compromise struggling to encompass 
the Belgian national scale against a background of diverging economic structures and interests of 
its two communities. 
Although Ohmae (1995) has long suggested that the nation-state is no longer the optimal 
unit for organizing economic activity, the hypothesis implying that national borders are weak de-
scriptors of economic frontiers is admittedly in need of ‘a little theory’ to ‘come up with predicted 
effects of redrawing some sensitive political boundaries’ (Frankel and Rose, 2000). The Belgian 
case reveals a complex yet uncontroversial story behind regional partitioning based on the gov-
ernance of a socio-spatial basis apt to offer the necessary coherence supporting relevant policy 
development. However, factual observations do not make up for a theory. We recognize economic 
frontiers demarcating areas of affluence, for example, Upper Rhine Valley, San Francisco Bay Area, 
or Hong-Kong-South China, when we see them, although are not equally adept at prefiguring 
such territorial configurations of variable geometry before they take off. In this paper, we aim to 
contribute to a theory of the economic frontier inspired in particular by the contemporary process 
of European integration. This understanding should prepare us to devise a new model for the 
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European integration project (as should do for the theory of integration in general).
Our argument advances in two steps. First, we break down the theoretical case of the ex-
istence of economic frontiers into macro- and micro-views. A juxtaposition of both perspectives 
delineates a welfare-maximizing integration area within which business patterns take advantage 
of self-enforcing growth opportunities; in other words, areas that are competitively viable on their 
own. As a working concept, we call such a region unitary economic area (UEA). Second, we put 
to test the hypothesized existence of UEAs by exploring the case of Romania, a typical peripheral 
member country, to infer some experimental propositions about how our theoretical framework 
applies to a country’s economic frontiers in the context of European integration. 
II. A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ECONOMIC FRONTIERS
In economists’ interpretation (Lösch, 1940 (1954), p. 198; Pelkmans, 2006, p. 2), an economic fron-
tier is a geographical boundary beyond which the economic flows (of factors, goods, services and 
information) of a community transact at increased costs. The concept has also drawn the atten-
tion of other social researchers. Probably most famous among all, historian Fernand Braudel con-
sidered book-length arguments about the foundation of a world-economy or économie monde 
in his native French, delineated by spatial, as well as temporal boundaries. His world-economies 
examples include the Mediterranean (Braudel, 1995 (1949)) and Capitalism (Braudel, 1984 (1979)), 
two spatial-temporal contexts of development, co-existing with political jurisdictions, which in-
form about the intricate fabric of historical, social, and political decision-making processes ac-
counting directly for a community’s welfare.
Independent contributions from political science (Kohr, 1941; Garreau, 1981; Dupeyron, 
1998), economic geography (Simmie and Martin, 2010; Groot et al, 2011), cultural studies (Florida 
et al, 2008), business studies (Porter, 2000; Ricart et al, 2004) or even businessmen (Heineken, 
1992) concur in observing that modern economic life has a strong territorial rather than political 
foundation. An area of integrated markets may reveal itself from a macro-perspective, as an aggre-
gate of multiple jurisdictions, or alternatively from base level where the economic space appears 
as a hub-and-spoke pattern of myriad business connections. 
The macro-view works by carrying out incremental additions and exclusions of units of 
analysis to find an optimal grand jurisdiction whereby ‘optimization’ designates a welfare-improv-
ing process. Ideally, the degree of heterogeneity between area members is sufficiently low to per-
mit collectively the best economic prospects and sufficiently high to reap the highest attainable 
economies of scale. At the micro level, the removal of border barriers leaves behind a rugged land-
scape over which the economic activities disperse or concentrate geographically: some businesses 
find now easier to operate over vast distances, building up production networks along the same or 
related commodity chains; at the same time, other activities tend to locate within small territorial 
areas, giving rise to agglomerations of people, industries and infrastructure. We’ll discuss in turn 
these conceptual premises of an ‘economic frontier’. 
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A. A macro-view of the economic frontier
Dating back to the 1950s, preoccupations with the impact of varying economic policies on a 
countries group’s welfare resulted in a series of studies investigating optimal institutional design. 
Examples of such interests include the cases of establishing a customs union (Viner, 1950), or re-
distribution in federal countries (Scott ,1950; Rothenberg, 1970). Among them, and probably the 
most resonating with the current EU economic turmoil, was the issue of optimum currency areas, 
OCA (Mundell, 1961). 
Also originating in the same period, the theory of clubs, with contributions from Olson 
(1965) and Buchanan (1965) among others, has the merit of creating a more general schema of 
how and why countries (or more generally, individual actors) would find it advantageous to be 
part of the same group. A club thus appears as a negotiated jurisdiction which provides its mem-
bers with benefits resulting from economies of scale and externalities associated with the con-
sumption of some ‘core’ goods, goods that are essential for the club formation in the first place. At 
the same time, club members incur costs with each new entrant whose choice over the club goods 
diverges from the common set of preferences and so leads to inefficient outcomes for the group 
as a whole. The net effect of the benefits of scale and externality and the costs of heterogeneity 
depends on both club objectives and membership size and eventually places a club members’ 
welfare level closer to or further from the optimal state.
Seen through club lenses, Mundell’s theory, for example, implies that the size of a union 
has (1) a lower limit set by the number of countries permitting free movement of factors and 
goods and (2) an upper limit set by the transactions costs that tend to increase with the number 
of currencies. The world will be then the ideal currency area unless the stabilization effects of 
monetary policy appear highly ineffectual to this end over a large territory. Such a club reaches its 
optimum size when trespassing the OCA boundary becomes costly for a non-member: macroeco-
nomic shocks such as a fall in demand for domestic goods cannot be absorbed (e.g. by keeping 
employment stable) unless jobs and investors move effortlessly and find quickly other opportuni-
ties in locations beyond national borders. As subsequent research has emphasized, the optimal 
size of this club (called a monetary union) depends also on other criteria, including for example 
similarity of ‘development potentials, political interests and societal preferences’ (Ahrens et al, 
2005). This leads us to a more accurate view of the determinants on one hand, although it makes 
the marginal impact of scale and heterogeneity increasingly hard to assess, on the other hand. As 
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) commented on the OCA argument, ‘it remains difficult to move 
from theory to empirical work and policy analysis’, a conclusion that other studies (e.g. Brixiova 
et al, 2009, Cerqueira and Martins, 2011) attempting to search for an unambiguous test for the 
optimum size of a monetary union seem not to contradict.
Adopting a common currency illustrates just one of the possible key decisional areas spe-
cific to a complex club. The EU project has built on the assumption that every one of its various 
common policies, for example, on the internal market, agriculture, external trade, exchange rate, 
regional development, or research and innovation, would create better conditions for growth than 
independent national policy making. This premise has been, however, contested by research (e.g. 
Casella, 1992; Manzini and Mariotti, 1999; Feldman and Martin, 2004; Ahrens et al, 2005) showing 
that increased institutional complexity leads to sub-optimal states for the ‘consumption’ of each 
of the co-existing club goods (read: common policy). The attempt to arrive at a reducible common 
denominator for welfare improvement branches off in as many venues for research as optimality 
criteria exist. 
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The concept of ‘differentiated integration’ (Watson, 2004; Dyson and Marcussen, 2010) suggests 
that the EU political integration advances to the extent that a negotiated decision can be found as 
to the optimal conditionalities of its various clubs. The first stages of integration could accommo-
date relatively easy overlapping membership of apparently conflicting clubs; say the ‘agriculture’ 
and the ‘customs union’ ones. The present, however, raises the stakes considerably, in terms of the 
optimal degree of heterogeneity suitable to sustain a workable integration mechanism. 
B. A micro-view of the economic frontier
The economic benefits of market integration will fare even better, runs the textbook argument, 
if the four fundamental freedoms of the EU (free mobility of goods and services, as well as the 
production factors of labour and capital) extend to the global scale of the economy. The EU pro-
motes free trade agreements with third parties indeed [1], in the sound logic of liberalism, yet it 
can hardly contemplate the perspective of its internal market ceasing to be regulated differently 
from the rest of the world. 
At smaller geographical scale, an EU member faces a similar ambivalent position: to make 
progress towards a deeper level of integration responds to its own interest even though some local 
circumstances of development may escape the logic of economic liberalism. This effect is a result 
of the varying degrees of spatial availability of the production factors. For highly mobile factors 
like labour and capital, the larger the available area wherein they are able to move, the better the 
chances are to find the most profitable opportunities. Other factors like land and landscape, social 
capital or tacit knowledge do not move; they underpin production within a relatively small geo-
graphical area, the area of their origin. The removal of barriers thus makes possible a more efficient 
use of some of the factors through increased mobility, although has little or no direct impact on 
those factors whose value depends on their local use alone. In this way, the spatial organization of 
economic activity unfolds within a large area of variable geometry along spokes of dispersed chains 
of business networks, outsourcing factors at their most efficient location, as well as around hubs 
of agglomerations of regional economic linkages overlapping little if at all the neat demarcations 
of administrative jurisdictions.
It is only lately that the sustained removal of barriers has led to sizeable reconfigurations 
of industrial and specialization patterns at territorial level, and so permitted a broader view of the 
actual contours of a community’s economy whose prosperity depends as much on the efficient 
allocation of resources as on the synergy of regional factors. Economics informed by geography 
complements standard microeconomics with a value creation model (see Table 1) which ties the 
gains from trade to a spatial organization of the economy in networks, agglomerations or a com-
bination between the two. These two modes of market organization ‘are located between the 
atomistic structure of an uncoordinated market and the organic structure of a vertical hierarchy’ 
(EC, 2012, p. 179), a conceptualization that shifts the focus of analysis towards loci of value-added 
creation emerging as geographical representations rather than abstract transactional flows and 
eliciting empirical evidence on spatial commonality rather than market optimality. The novel in-
terpretation of market integration has made the awareness about economic frontiers inevitable.
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TABLE 1 - GAINS FROM MARKET INTEGRATION
Study area Classical view Modern view
Source of gains Specialization and trade Networks and agglomerations
Actors Atomized market participants Community-based market participants
Empirical evidence Market optimization Spatial commonality
Source: Research results
Lösch’s (1940 (1954)) study of ‘punctiform’ and ‘areal’ spatial configurations of the market 
produced not only the first elaborate analysis of economic frontier (‘boundary’ in his terminology), 
but also prefigured the difficulties in making it a subject matter on its own. On the conceptual 
side, Lösch thinks of market transactions ‘basically in terms of space’ (Lösch, 1954, p. 252) and 
consequently draws boundaries around market areas that are ‘entirely self-sufficient economically’ 
and naturally arranged, i.e. without deliberate state interference, ‘in such a way that, once set go-
ing, it shall continue on the whole by itself.’ (Lösch, 1954, p. 196). From a spatial perspective, he ar-
gues, benefits that accrue to ‘a typical exporter’ or ‘importer’ (Lösch, 1954, p. 253) are contingent 
on varying costs and location conditions of a market area that either extend beyond or lie within 
political boundaries, in which case the theory of comparative cost becomes largely ineffective in 
explaining international trade as flows between countries treated as points. 
Yet, it is on the analytical side where Lösch’s guidance falls short of mapping the ‘economic 
width’ of a boundary. His selection of historical examples informs that simple and uniform ‘eco-
nomic interests’ lead to a more productive ‘adjustment of politics to economics’ (Lösch, 1954, p. 
202). The premise was reinforced later by Linder (1961), who determines the pattern of trade as 
a result of the similarity of supply and demand areas to which a country’s production system is 
part so that a greater overlap of product categories is conducive to a greater potential of trade [2]. 
However, mapping spatial commonality of this kind has proved an elusive target to accompany the 
geographical dimension. One of the most notable attempts to reconcile economics with geogra-
phy, the World Bank’s World Development Report 2009, faced criticism manifestly for ‘paradigmatic 
blind spots’ and for policy recommendations ignoring ‘highly important issues of power and poli-
tics, gender and ethnicity, justice and environment’ (cf. Mäki and Marchionni, 2011). 
What seems to explain the difficulty in moving conclusively towards a new framework 
centred on territorial rather than market optimality is that the characteristics of local economies 
able to support businesses’ value-creation chain are hardly a topic of mono-disciplinary concern. 
Lösch’s ‘economic width’, the area of uniform economic interests, is, in fact, a multi-layered socio-
economic habitat of apparently disparate influences. Its territorial limits, political organization 
and economic specialization result from a complex interplay between path dependencies, history, 
culture and developmental capabilities (Florida et al, 2008; Yeung and Lin, 2003; Simmie and Mar-
tin, 2010; Woolcock et al, 2011; Krapohl and Fink, 2013). In need of a unifying concept, we call this 
spatial locus of economic value-creation a unitary economic area (UEA) [3] to replace national 
economy as the main unit of analysis in assessing gains from market integration.
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C. Summary: mapping economic frontiers into the integration space
With ever larger membership, the economic frontier of an optimal club is less supposed to overlap 
the outer territorial limits of the joining members. If we aim at finding an optimal organization 
of club constituencies, we should expect instead to map an integration area into self-governing 
spaces of integration or UEAs. In our bi-dimensional framework, an UEA is a club designed to 
provide an optimal context of development to its members, which, on the one hand, are willing 
to share resources with other members to reap the benefits from externalities and economies of 
scale brought about by their union, and, on the other hand, are able to target policy initiatives at 
a geographical scale that reflect directly regional commonality. In reference to the EU integration 
project in particular, we advance two propositions in defence of our hypothesis.
First, the changing landscape of integration has brought out a remodelling of the EU terri-
tory from national to multiple yet non-excludable identities transversal to administrative jurisdic-
tions. The tendency became visible in the 1980s when the Union meant to represent ‘a Europe of 
regions’, only to be re-baptized lately by such proxies as ‘communities of communities’ (Etzioni, 
2007) or ‘a union for the peoples of Europe’ (State of the Union, 2012, p. 18). The range of searches 
is illustrative for the conceptual gap to interpret societal modernity within a complex project of 
integration: Is it the nation-state or are there other relevant jurisdictions that should guide the 
Union’s governance blueprint for a welfare-increasing (optimal) integration? Field researches, as 
well as sociological and cultural surveys (e.g. Schild, 2001; Mols et al, 2009) tell us that the Europe-
an citizen has grown up used to eschew the dichotomy between European and national to appeal 
to a thick community representation, of social, cultural, and historical nature, to assert her/his be-
longingness. The task of configuring the fitting territorial arrangement is by all means challenging: 
a conference call identified no less than thirteen primary categories of ‘institutionalized, legal or 
customary’ autonomy arrangements in the world [4], including shared or negotiated sovereignty, 
federalism, territorial autonomy, personal autonomy, or functional autonomy.
Lianos and Le Blanc (2012) argue for a paradigmatic shift relative to the theory of EU inte-
gration on the ground of the ‘ontological requirement’ of enabling a progressive state of integra-
tion between ‘competing rationalities’ of different sub-systems interacting across national bound-
aries. This is an institutional framework, runs their argument, within which the welfare effects 
are likely to improve in the presence of trust-enhancing mechanisms among market participants, 
where ‘trust’ is operationalized by proxies such as geographical proximity, common language, 
shared values and preferences. At the origin of this thesis lies an apparent paradox: whereas the 
services sector accounts for 70 per cent of the EU GDP, this is the perennial laggard as to the 
regulatory framework tasks precisely because the policy options have to confront ‘deep identity-
loaded social choices’ only nurtured in a ‘system trust’ based integration environment (Lianos and 
Gerard, 2012). In other words, in the current constellation of political (national) jurisdictions, the 
social fabric of integration makes the greatest EU source of wealth creation one of the least apt to 
play a decisive role in the completion of the internal market.  
This view of close communities resonates well with parallel efforts arguing for a positive 
correlation between decision-making effectiveness and identity capital in the form, for example, 
of the institutional capability to share values (Sen, 1999; Michaels, 2009), symbolic meanings 
(James et al, 2007; Mukerji, 2011), power and influence (Johnson and Berrett, 2011). The main 
lesson of this scholarship is that the benefits of market liberalization reach an asymptotic limit 
in the realm of close communities when adherence to the same (fundamental) values is critical 
to achieve internal market reform rather than the other way round. The silent transformation of 
the identitary profile of integration actors facilitates a clear-cut distinction between geographical 
ON ECONOMIC FRONTIERS: EXPLORING THE RATIONALE BEHIND MODERN MARKET INTEGRATION8
Valentin Cojanu 
proximity and regional commonality. Research capitalizing on this distinction (e.g. Petithomme, 
2009; Danson and de Souza, 2012) emphasizes the role of both socio-cultural motivators (institu-
tions, value structures, social intelligence, power relations, symbols) and economic factors (ad-
vantages in production, consumption, and geographical location) in re-modelling borders as part 
of an exercise to understand the difference between resilient and inert local economies, between 
territorial and institutional proximity. 
Our second proposition connects spatial identity to its functionality or raison d’être. At-
tempting to distinguish economically successful habitats from less successful ones raises the ques-
tion of how identitary roots turn into increased welfare benefits. A first answer is provided by a 
new generation of gravity models of trade (e.g. Frankel and Rose, 2000; Ghemawat, 2001; Thoenig 
et al, 2009), which has shown exponential increases in the gains from market integration when 
cultural determinants are also factored in besides usual variables like physical distance and eco-
nomic size.
The ultimate test of functionality, then, consists in proving that an UEA is indeed the ap-
propriate locus where the characteristics of territoriality and commonality are mutually supporting 
in areas of common policy management (such as wages and prices, internal competition, income 
redistribution, taxation) permitting positive adjustments to the peaks and troughs of economic 
activity, or as Pelkmans (2006) suggests, ‘a general impetus for change’ (p. 3). The next section 
discusses this hypothesis on the case of an EU member state, Romania. 
III. DISCUSSION ON ROMANIA AS A COUNTRY CASE
The following discussion is but a crude estimate of the answer to the analytical question of an 
economic frontier delineating a country’s UEA. Similar endeavours have emphasized either the 
macro view or the homogeneity criterion over large integration areas such as Europe (Kohr, 1941; 
Heineken, 1992) or North America (Garreau, 1981; Dupeyron, 2008) or the micro view or the con-
centration of factor flows at small geographical scale (ESPON Programme 2010). Our approach, 
which relies on country data, lays somewhere in between: we produce a statistical shortcut of the 
geography of economic integration at the expense of delineating elaborate territorial partitioning 
that would “resemble a seam…through the elaborate maze of market networks” (Lösch, 1954, p. 
199). Rough though our results may appear, they reveal a consistent pattern of spatial configura-
tions forming a unitary socio-economic space within which Romania, our country case of choice, 
would benefit from advanced gains of market integration.      
A. Methodology
We look first at country groupings recognisable by similar institutional and economic trends, as 
well as by close visions about societal preferences (see Table 2). Minimizing the structural distance 
between countries along various variables, such as economic structure, preferences, income levels, 
etc., have been often a preferred exercise to show which European countries will be candidates of 
an optimal club (union) (Ahrens et al, 2005; Sugawara and Zalduendo, 2010). We adopt a similar 
approach and run a statistical test of agglomerations (cluster analysis) to identify country group-
ings according to the degree of homogeneity in relation to six variable categories consisting of 30 
social, cultural, economic, and institutional indices for 46 economies. Data were processed data 
with the WAVERAGE cluster method of linkage within groups and standardized it by the standard 
deviation of the values (variable SD). Squared Euclidean distance (SEUCLID) is the clustering mea-
sure for distance or similarity.
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TABLE 2 - SETS OF VARIABLES AND COUNTRY SAMPLE
Determinants Indicators Sources
Human Development
3 indices: Human development index, Urban 
population as percentage of the total popu-
lation, Health expenditure per capita





5 indices: GDP per capita (PPP value), High 
tech exports as percentage of total exports 
of manufactured goods, Exports per capita, 
Inward Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), 
Gross capital formation as percentage of 
GDP.
Human Development Report 
2005/2009 [http://hdr.undp.org/en/
statistics/]
The World Bank Database [http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator].
Competition
6 indices: Intensity of local competition, The 
business costs of corruption, Government 
debt, Interest rate spread, Extent of market-
ing, and Growth Competitiveness Index 
(GCI)





5 indices: Public trust of politicians, Wasteful-
ness of government spending, Burden of gov-
ernment regulation, Judicial independence, 
Efficiency of legal framework; 







5 indices: Utility patents, Company spending 
on R&D, University - industry collaboration, 
Capacity for innovation, Average for the last 
three indices;






6 indices: The public expenditure on educa-
tion,  Internet users (per capita for 2005 and 
out of 100 for 2009), Education – upper level, 
Family importance in life (as a percentage to 
the total number of individuals participat-
ing in the survey), Employment Status (full 
time employed percentage of individuals 
participating in the survey); Autonomy index 
(independence/determination percentage 
of individuals participating in the survey), 
Leisure time importance in life (as percentage 
reported to the total number of individuals 
participating in the survey).
World Value Survey Database [http://
www.worldvaluesurvey.org], [http://
wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp] 





Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Latvia, Lebanon, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Occupied Palestin-
ian Territories, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Swit-
zerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom
Source: Research results
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Tabel notes: 
(1) No data were available for Lebanon and Occupied Palestinian Territories for 2009 for Competition, Institutions and Research and 
Development; Lebanon, Libya, Occupied Palestinian Territories, Syrian Arab Republic and Tunisia for 2009 Socio-cultural identity (ex-
cept for Public Expenditure on Education and Internet users per 100)
(2) For Socio-cultural identity, the latest available data come from 2005 for the following countries: Albania, Algeria, Austria, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxem-
bourg, Malta, Montenegro, Slovakia; For Economic Performance, the most recent data are from 2007 for High-technology exports, 
Inward FDI and Gross Capital Formation.
Subsequently, a statistical examination of Romania’s bilateral trade relations with all Eu-
ropean countries helps visualise economic interconnectedness at micro level. We measure the 
concentration of flows within industries (intra-industry trade, IIT) and distinguish IIT as either 
vertically (VIIT) or horizontally (HIIT) according to trade structures based on exchanges of similar 
goods of different or identical quality, respectively. Our analysis is done for country pairs involving 
Romania and all EU and non-EU European countries1. We use the Eurostat database EasyComext 
for 1999 and 2010 at 3-digit level of aggregation, which yields 279 SITC (Standard International 
Trade Classification) product categories.
We measure and decompose IIT following Fontagné et al (2005) as follows: we calculated 
for each product group the degree of overlap between export and import values and assumed 
that the minority flow represent at least 10% of the majority flow. Then, we considered inter-
industry trade type: if the minor flow is at least 10% of the inflow, it was considered intra-industry 
trade. If export and import unit values differ less than 25% then we have two-way trade in hori-
zontally differentiated products, otherwise two-way trade in vertically differentiated products. If 
unit value is not available, then the two-way trade is not-allocated.
B. Findings for the macro (regional) context
We present in Table 3 a synoptic image of the cluster analysis results for two years (2005 and 2009). 
We counted all country associations for each result set corresponding to the six sets of variables 
plus one additional for the whole set of variables. We form a quasi-permanent cluster with coun-
tries that belong to the same group for at least five times and include additional countries if they 
associate with the group membership for at least three times.
1   Hungary, Bulgaria, Italy, Germany, Poland, UK, Greece, Netherlands, Austria, France, Croatia, Sweden, Ukraine, Turkey, 
Slovenia, Spain, Serbia, Czech R., Portugal, Slovakia, Denmark, Cyprus, Moldova, Estonia, Belgium, Lithuania, Finland, 
Latvia, Ireland, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Luxembourg, Albania, Malta
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TABLE 3 - PATTERNS OF CLUSTER MEMBERSHIP
Quasi-permanent clusters* 2005 Quasi-permanent clusters* 2009
Germany and Austria
Other country associations** Switzerland, Netherlands
Germany and Austria




Denmark, Norway, and Sweden 
Other country associations** Finland
France, Belgium
Other country associations** Sweden, Finland
United Kingdom and Ireland
Other country associations** Belgium
Spain, Portugal
Other country associations** Greece, Malta
Italy and Spain
Other country associations** Greece
Egypt, Jordan
Other country associations** Tunisia, Morocco, Alge-
ria
Egypt, Morocco
Other country associations** Tunisia, Jordan 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia
Other country associations** Lithuania, Hungary, Slo-
venia
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania
Other country associations** Estonia
Romania, Bulgaria
Other country associations** Turkey, Algeria, Egypt
Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey






* Same cluster membership for at least 5 out of 7 sets of variables
** Same cluster membership for at least 3 out of 7 sets of variables
In general, our findings are much in line with the perceived division of the continent in 
highly homogeneous core country groups: Germany and Austria, associated with Switzerland 
and Netherlands; Denmark and Norway, as well as Sweden and Finland; Northern Mediterranean 
countries (Spain, Greece) and Southern Mediterranean countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Jor-
dan); Czech Republic and Slovakia, associated with Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), as 
well as the Baltic countries themselves as distinct group; and, finally, Romania and Bulgaria, associ-
ated with Turkey, Algeria, Egypt. 
The synoptic result above says simply that neither the EU nor the euro zone resemble a 
unitary group if we take into account several key characteristics of an economy; quite the con-
trary, we contemplate a highly fragmented space of integration with the EU membership split in 
at least three groups, in all iterations. However, we have left unanswered the question whether 
the distance between groups is large enough to make the heterogeneity degree a relevant factor. 
Also, we have not accounted for some obscure spots: there are countries like Italy, France, Ireland, 
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Great Britain, Belgium, Malta, Hungary, or Poland for which no stable association could be found 
and countries like Luxembourg, Iceland, Portugal, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Syrian Arab Republic, 
Albania, Cyprus, or Jordan that pop up in the same country grouping for two times at most, all 
iterations considered.   
 According to our hypothesis, the clearly delineated groupings suggest the rough con-
tours of an UEA and hence set the stage for further tests searching for evidence of viable, function-
ally connected economic linkages within their territorial limits. The realism of our results is better 
assessed in light of two further observations.
 First, as evidence at both European and global scale show, the space is fragmented indeed 
in groups of countries for which similarity (of development, economic structures etc.) between 
their member states plays a greater role in arriving at converging and self-enforcing economic 
evolutions, for example, synchronic business cycles, than mere economic liberalism would sug-
gest. In novel yet unsettled terminology varying from convergence clubs (Eickmeier and Breitung, 
2006; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006; Ramajo et al, 2008) to homogeneous areas of growth (Kose et 
al, 2008; Clark and Beckfield, 2009), economists record patterns of development that suggest a 
vision of market integration composed of several ‘internal markets’ or UEAs, in our terms, driven 
by comparable competitive potentialities. In other words, the conclusion of this line of research is 
not that the process of European integration would necessarily lead to UEA formation, but that 
the existence in the first place of these country groupings, highly homogeneous, will strengthen 
their own growth in particular, and that of the greater area of integration in general. 
Second, it is during further, more thorough, investigations that the case for the existence of 
UEA strengthens or weakens. As it happens, our case of choice illuminates this supposition. Roma-
nia and Bulgaria form a stable grouping, an UEA, which usually includes also Turkey, Algeria, and 
Egypt. Illustrative for the strength of this grouping is the stability of its membership from 2005 to 
2009 for the variable ‘socio-cultural identity’ which supposedly weighs heavily on the importance 
we attach to group homogeneity. At the same time, however, while the presence of Turkey could 
be implied by common historical legacy with both Romania and Bulgaria, we certainly wonder 
about the (practical) relevance of the association of the two countries with Algeria or Egypt for 
which neither history nor geography suggests a mutual bond. Indeed, it should come as no sur-
prise that far distant countries could find mutual similarities although the case of their common 
belonging to an UEA is irrelevant. The observation holds true also for neighbouring countries 
(Romania vs. Hungary or Italy vs. Austria) for which geographical proximity is no substitute for 
the large differences as to their key economic variables. The context of a country’s development 
relates necessarily to both geographical proximity and close structural factors vis-à-vis other club’s 
members.
C. Findings for the micro (business) context
A hierarchy of bilateral relations at world level ranked after the IIT share in total trade shows the 
top ten values  ranging from 88.7 per cent (Germany-France) to 77.3 per cent (Taiwan-Singapore) 
(Fontagné et al, 2005). According to the same source, the range of HIIT shares varies from 30 per 
cent to 50 per cent, with superior values specific to bilateral trade relations between Asian coun-
tries (South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, and Singapore). 
Compared to these values, data for Romania show an upward trend with the highest shares 
of IIT in the range from 70.23 per cent (Romania-Portugal) in 1999 to 80.25 per cent (Romania-
Germany) in 2010, and for HIIT from 26.7 per cent (Romania-Croatia, Romania-Sweden) in 1999 
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to 37.88 per cent (Romania-Hungary) in 2010. The ten year period brought about significant and 
positive changes. In 2010, with the exception of four European countries, at least 20 per cent of 
each bilateral relationship count as IIT and for 17 countries the same share is at least 50 per cent. 
Data on exchanges of similar goods differentiated by quality (HIIT) (Figure 1) point to a 
nascent hub and spoke pattern of interconnected economic structures. Significantly higher indi-
ces are specific to countries which either were under communist regimes (Hungary, Bulgaria and 
Poland) or rank as both the most notable investors in Romania and main destination markets for 
Romanian exports (Germany, Italy, Greece, Great Britain, Netherlands). The change in the hierar-
chy since 1999 is, however, important: only Bulgaria, Hungary, and Germany numbered then also 
among the first ten, with Sweden and Croatia in top ten, each with a share of 26.7 per cent. Con-
stant rearrangements of business networks, which naturally occurred before and after Romania’s 
EU accession in 2007, may explain the difference. The number of products sold in HIIT increased 
at least two times between 1999 and 2010 in most relationships, which speaks for itself for the 
magnitude of the changes. There are nevertheless two characteristics of the present trade pattern 
that point to a stable trend ahead.  
FIGURE 1. SHARES OF HORIZONTAL INTRA-INDUSTRIAL TRADE IN TOTAL BILATERAL 
TRADE BETWEEN ROMANIA AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES (IN PERCENTAGE) (2010)
Source: Author’s calculation
First, highly competitive relations with countries in geographical proximity (Hungary, Bul-
garia, Serbia increasing from nil in 1999 to 10.6 per cent in 2010) indicate the formation of a 
regional market with similar supply and demand characteristics. If, for most partners, the number 
of HIIT products does not exceed 20 in 2010, for the first two countries, Bulgaria and Hungary, it 
is 61 and 52 (from 21 and 14 in 1999), respectively. Disentangling trade is essential for our topic 
because a significant amount of intra-product trade, reflected in superior IIT indices, associates 
with an advanced stage of specialization in which product differentiation and economies of scale 
provide gains additional to those based on comparative costs alone and revealed by inter-industry 
trade. As the empirical evidence suggests (Segnana and Gabrisch, 2007; EC, 2010, p. 77), a country’s 
capability to reinforce its competitive position becomes a feasible option only in the presence of 
cross-border production networks leading to a significant amount of horizontal intra-product 
trade and vertical specialization (high shares of HIIT) due to increased pressure from competitors 
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dealing with identical products (in both range and quality).
Reliance on country data does not allow us to figure out how a country’s regions position 
themselves along the existing and emerging business chains. We may only hypothesize that Ro-
manian regions would integrate differently in the adjoining UEAs to bear relevance for the type 
and sources of its companies’ competitive advantage. Relevant empirical evidence is scarce, but 
from the few data available we note that this may be indeed the case. Iraq is Turkey’s largest ex-
port market after Germany, but 70 per cent of that trade flow to Kurdistan Regional Government, 
a self-governed territory of the size of Switzerland, which is the closest, both geographically and 
ethnically, Iraqi region to Turkey [5]. 
Second, several relations with countries that are not in geographic proximity are equally 
important. The fact that these partners are Romania’s most prominent trade and investment part-
ners (in 2010) is consistent with a general trend towards increased participation in production 
networks across the entire European economy. While competitive pressures and convergent mac-
roeconomic management help foster the pillars of growth in the economic hinterland, developing 
external relations along the spokes is a result of specialization within global commodity chains.  
IV. CONCLUSION
Weighing up the arguments in favour of the creation of a common currency, Mundell was scep-
tic that the economic arguments would appeal to the political class, as ‘the question is purely 
academic since it hardly appears within the realm of political likelihood that national currencies 
would ever be abandoned in favor of any other arrangement.’ (Mundell, 1961) Pelkmans took a 
similarly dim view of the political economy of integration when he observed, ‘in a fantasy world 
without national governments or “nation-states”, economic integration would boil down to pure 
market integration – presumably apolitical.’ (2006, p. 3) Mundell’s defeatism did not survive the 
creation of the Euro-zone in 1999 which proved that academic prescriptions may eventually pre-
vail in spite of the least feasible political circumstances. According to this paper’s argument, time 
is also ripe to improve on Pelkmans’ resignation. 
For most of its history, the European integration project capitalized on the participating 
states’ willingness to remove barriers to the free movement of goods and factors and acquiesce to 
be part of a common regulatory framework. Although the scope for further liberalization of mar-
kets is by all means a premise of continued growth in the EU, the changed landscape of integration 
resets the whole project to new beginnings. An updated view of economic liberalism explains 
both why (due to a new conceptual framework) and how (by a new governance framework) that 
would be the case.
A new conceptual framework of integration is instrumental in adapting the ambitious 
desiderata of growth recovery and welfare improvement to the reality of a Union that has trans-
formed itself along three directions at least. First, the new entrants have widened the range of 
preferences over common policies thereby diminishing the policy relevance of one-size-fits-all 
Community initiatives. Second, the economic incentives of taking advantage of production fac-
tors wherever they are available can now be pursued almost costlessly within the entire integra-
tion space. Third, it increased awareness about immovable resources, tangible and intangible, that 
mould local specificity into economic advantages.
The reality of a reconfigured space of integration brings to centre stage areas of conver-
gent evolutions delineated by economic frontiers. Following the case of Romania, we have been 
able to prefigure, in rough contours admittedly, the case of a unitary economic area. Together 
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with Bulgaria, and possibly Turkey and Serbia, Romania belongs to an internal market of self-sus-
taining development potential. Various variables, economic, institutional and socio-cultural, dis-
tinguish these countries along highly similar characteristics, preferences and performances. Their 
geographical area in fact outlines the greatest domestic market or jurisdiction that minimizes 
the costs of heterogeneity. At the same time, the benefits of market integration have become so 
more closely related to identifiable clusters of commonality rather than market liberalization. Cor-
roborating the results of cluster analysis, IIT and HIIT indices, Romania and other UEA countries 
or regions benefit from homogeneous conditions of growth and largely identical strengths and 
vulnerabilities of competitive drivers. 
The acknowledgment of economic frontiers would fit only in part the EU policy space. A 
spatial planning framework, gradually put in motion around four interrelated pillars [6] between 
1999 and 2008, seems to have not been enough to prevent harsh verdicts, ‘EU law is structurally ill 
adapted to organizing regionalism’ (Evans, 2002), nor to lead to actual progress in designing a new 
governance framework as the ’”territory matters” coalition’ is still on the fringe of the EU policy-
making (Waterhout, 2011). It is worth anticipating here at least two issues on this governance 
agenda.
First, identifying economic frontiers seems as much contentious a debate as fixing a coun-
try’s political (national) boundaries loomed about four centuries ago, although the ammunition 
consists now of entrenched identity perceptions and administrative privileges rather than bel-
licose oratory and military engagements. However, the parallel reads on its positive side as well: 
in the same manner the nation-state represented a political solution for harnessing resources for 
economic and social progress at some historical time, so would now a territorial arrangement or-
ganized around areas of common specificities account better for further resources for growth. As 
Hein (2003) emphasized, present development processes are less a product of national societies, 
but ‘of the relations between locations in an expanding world economy.’
Second, fast recognition of the change of rationale underlying economic liberalism would 
accelerate the dynamics of integration. One appropriate corollary is that policies should be mo-
tivated by a territorial vision adapted to achieve self-sustaining competitive fit, devising policies 
around similarities in interests, capabilities, stimuli, motives, attitudes, able to enhance autono-
mous sources of growth. Of all shared assets of the Union, the territory seems to encapsulate at 
best the platform of future growth in the same way the (Single) Market stands for the past stages 
of European integration. Exploiting the benefits of agglomerations and networks, the typical ways 
of spatial economic organization, implies a strong territorial focus of business strategies in virtu-
ally unbound perimeters. However, invisible confines we call economic frontiers circumscribe, at 
various geographical scale, territories wherein lay the foundations of economic success or failure. 
Positive feedbacks, in the way people adopt cultural attitudes in spurring entrepreneurship and 
regulating businesses, firms react to profit opportunities, and institutions launch similar policy 
responses to deflate or absorb economic shocks, depend on highly homogeneous identitary re-
gional profiles.
We conclude by suggesting that the inclusion of economic frontiers on the integration agenda will 
result in effective policy initiatives directed to augmenting resources for growth within the Union. 
From this viewpoint, phenomena across territories and populations and not between or within 
countries supposedly hold the key to understand modern market integration. Consequently, nei-
ther disintegration, nor superstatism, but remapping integration around variable boundaries of 
unitary economic areas, this paper contends, would revitalize growth on the continent.
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Endnotes
[1] Estimates show that the proposed “transatlantic trade and investment partnership” TTIP will 
boost the EU’s GDP by around 0.4% by getting rid of remaining tariffs and by 3% by removing half 
of the non-tariff barriers. (“Free trade across the Atlantic”, The Economist, February 16th, 2013, 11-
12)
[2] Linder acknowledges that his argument holds true mainly for manufactures while the Heck-
scher-Ohlin’s theory of factor proportions continues to describe comparative advantage for trade 
in agricultural products.
[3] Coincidentally, the concept has been used to describe the formation of an integration agree-
ment between Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, which basically expounds the charac-
teristics of a common market; see “A joint statement on a unitary economic space”, gazeta.kz, 
24.02.2003, http://engnews.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=295422 [retrieved 05.04.2013]
[4] “Autonomy arrangements in the world - conference and compendium” organised by European 
Center for Minority Issues, Flensburg, Germany, Political Science Department of Babes-Bolyai Uni-
versity, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, Institute for Research on National Minorities, Cluj-Napoca, Roma-
nia. Information published in the March issue 2012 of Social Science News, GESIS-Leibniz Institute 
for the Social Sciences.
[5] The Economist (2013), “Northern Iraq. Peace, harmony and oil”, April 20th, 2013, p. 31
[6] The four pillars come under the labels of European Territorial Co-operation (1999), European 
Spatial Planning Observation Network ESPON (2002), the Territorial Agenda (2007), and Territo-
rial Cohesion (2008) (see Waterhout, 2011).
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O EKONOMSKIM GRANICAMA: ISTRAŽUJUĆI OBRAZLOŽENJE 
ZA MODERNU TRŽIŠNU INTEGRACIJU 
SAŽETAK
Rad tvrdi da dobrobiti projekta integracije tržišta dostižu asimptotsku granicu u okruženju usko 
povezanih zajednica kada je prisvajanje istih vrijednosti ključno za postizanje unutarnje reforme 
tržišta a ne obrnuto. Koristeći primjer projekta europske integracije, raspravlja se o konceptu eko-
nomske granice kao vježbi za preoblikovanje granica oko uzoraka razvoja, sastavljenoj od više 
„unutarnjih tržišta“ koje pokreću usporedivi konkurentni potencijali. U optimalnom kontekstu 
razvoja, članice su voljne, s jedne strane, dijeliti resurse s drugim članicama kako bi se požela do-
brobit iz popratnih pojava i ekonomija razmjera, dok su, s druge strane, sposobne usmjeriti se 
na političke inicijative koje u geografskim razmjerima izravno odražavaju regionalnu istovjetnost. 
Teorijski okvir je prikazan putem rasprave o Rumunjskoj kao zemlji slučaju pozivajući se na klaster 
analizu i podatke o trgovinskoj integraciji.
Ključne riječi: područje, optimalna nadležnost, tržišno područje, konkurentnost, Rumunjska
